NYC Junta

I started the discussion on Tuesday night with a sort of mini-argument: four points that I had arrived at over a couple of weeks reading on the subject of Iran, which I figured would get the ball rolling on the evening. Because of the sharp minds in attendance, it was all that was necessary to spark a great conversation. I said:

• Iran is the dominant power in the Middle East. This was a historical fact for a long time before Saddam Hussein’s Iraq became a check on Iran’s power—and now the US has removed that check. While Israel and Saudi Arabia are America’s allies in the region, Iran could take both of them, as it had indeed already defeated Israel in Lebanon. Even the US could not really take over Iran. We could bomb them into submission and take Tehran, but we would not be able to hold the country against the guerrilla threat they represent.
• Iran has the power to make the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan untenable, and indeed they have already done this to some degree. They have become experts at proxy warfare, and at this point they are able to determine the level of violence that US forces have to deal with in certain parts of both countries.
• All of this, it is important to note, does not require that Iran possess nuclear weapons. Indeed we (America) are quite powerless to stop them acquiring nukes if they are determined to have them. Sanctions won’t work; military attacks won’t work. Iran has the power to drive oil prices through the roof, by mining the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at tankers, which would make life in America very painful.
• Given all this, the best option is for America to reach some kind of settlement with Iran. This would involve giving Iran a formal role in maintaining the security of Iraq, which would likely end up partitioned. We would share responsibility for security of the Strait of Hormuz, because both countries have an interest in keeping the oil flowing. Trade and talk would increase as sanctions were lifted and diplomatic ties restored, and Iran would agree to stop arming Hezbollah and Hamas. America would stop talk of regime change and guarantee Iran’s security, in order to foster closer ties and stop the Iranians inching closer to Russia and China. In short, the US would balance its strategic alliances in the region.

There was some controversy in my words, because Jarrod came in right off the bat to challenge my first point, saying that Iran, in the wake of last year’s elections and subsequent protests, had never been weaker. And while it seems the mullahs aren’t going anywhere yet, I would concede that they might feel a bit restricted right now. Jarrod came back later in the evening, twice, on the point on nuclear weapons: the concern is not that Iran will use them, but that they will give them to others who will. “If a white light flashes over Israel, then that’s it, and Iran can say they had nothing to do with it.” Alex contended this forcefully, saying the uranium traces (or something) after an explosion would definitively prove where the bomb was made. So it seems Iran wouldn’t be able to get away with it, although that provides little comfort to Israel, since they are too small to absorb a nuclear explosion and still viably exist.

A lot was made of Ahmedinejad’s words towards Israel; although I argued that he didn’t have the final say in Iran, Noah said convincingly that he obviously spoke for the leadership. But Alex reminded us all that the fact is that there is no evidence Iran is pursuing nukes—citing the most recent intelligence reports. Noah claimed otherwise, mentioning the articles we have been seeing on our front pages for so long. But we also read a lot about Iraq’s weapons programs in the newspapers, I said, which turned out to be bluster.

We debated whether we could know the character of the Iranian people. Is there a “red/blue” divide, similar to America’s, with rural people more supportive of Ahmedinejad’s populism and jingoism, and urban “elites” more inclined towards cosmopolitanism and internationalism? Some argued in general support of this idea, although my conclusion was that we generally know very little of the Iranian people, despite the seeming ease of false labels.

The conversation broke into pieces several times during the evening, which was great. There were 10 people there, so it was inevitable that mini-convos would break out here and there. Of course I couldn’t follow everything that happened at once.

My most contentious point may have been the partitioning of Iraq. Some participants, Noah most vocally, said this would be crazy, that after spending so much blood and treasure we should “lose” Iraq. My point was that it was inevitable without American troops on the ground: should we stay forever? “Well, we’re still in Germany, we’re still in Korea,” Noah said. This is true of course, but it worries me. I don’t foresee a day when American soldiers are not being attacked in Iraq, or Afghanistan. I don’t think Korea and Germany are good models (in fact, I don’t think we should have troops in those countries, anyway). I argued that Iran already had some de facto control over southern Iraq, and that they would take it over when we left, anyway. But Noah seemed to think that we could leave a strong Iraqi government behind. This I doubt, and so it seemed we would not reach any agreement here.

Mark said something which put everything in perspective. Over the last 15-20 years (and I would argue, even longer), when the US has seen a geopolitical problem in the world, it has resolved to do something about it. We have gone into countries, or engaged with countries, in a way which we determined would solve the problem. We’ve taken decisive action. But most of the time, there have been unforeseen consequences that have either made the original problem worse, or created wholly new problems to deal with. Perhaps, in the future, we should endeavor to do less, to be more passive, and to let things play out before we act.

***

What are your thoughts? If you were there, fill in my account with points I missed. If you weren’t, what would you have added?

Wrap-Ups iran, israel, nukes, oil, politics, usa

WNYC carried a story this morning about American companies doing business in Iran. While technically it is illegal under American law for companies to deal with Iran, business successfully lobbied to be allowed to subvert the embargo by using their foreign subsidiaries. This is how, for example, Honeywell is able to sell Iran technology to refine oil into gasoline.

The SEC used to compile a list of companies that were evading sanctions in this manner. Lobbyists fought successfully to end that practice; however, the New York Times carried a story over the weekend listing 74 companies doing business with Iran despite US laws and national security strategies that aim to stifle such business. So who is really in charge? Uncle Sam or the oil and gas corporations? (For it is mainly energy companies on the list).

What’s more, the companies in violation (in spirit, if not in letter) are also recipients of major government contracts—totaling over $100 billion in the past decade. So not only do they flout the national policies of their government, but they aren’t even ostracized for doing so. Sounds like a compelling case for the pointlessness of sanctions.

In the News business, iran, politics, sanctions, usa

The lead essay in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs starts off with “The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to become the world’s tenth nuclear power”. It goes on from there to sketch out US options for containment, barely dwelling on the current arguments about whether sanctions will work, whether some military option should be used—it is a planning paper for a post-nuclear Iran. The authors take the view that Iran can be contained that if the US plays its cards right it doesn’t have to change the strategic equation in the middle east.

I don’t want to paraphrase all the author’s arguments, but a couple of points. Firstly, I find it a strange balancing act for the US to be sending senior foreign policy officials to the Gulf nations, who are also fearful of a nuclear Iran. On the one hand, we are trying to tell these “allies”, where we have military bases and from which we currently receive vital oil supplies, that we will protect them. Iran loves to incite these countries’ restive Shiite populations and Iran, similar to Japan before in the first part of the 20th century, sees itself as a liberator of Muslims in the region from western imperialism. But in the US there is a strong movement to move away from oil, to decouple ourselves from these regimes, so I would imagine leadership in those countries are complaining about mixed messages. I, for one, am tired of propping up these feckless Gulf states where the locals do no work and import south Asians to do everything while they live off their labor and oil while quietly financing terrorist activity.

It’s also hard to argue with Iran’s logic for acquiring nuclear arms. Surrounded on both sides by US forces (Iraq and Afghanistan) and mindful that non-nuclear Iraq was invaded and nuclear North Korea still hasn’t been, the Mullahs see the bomb as part of a guarantee of their continued rule. Their rhetoric and recent actions seem to almost invite a military strike against them, which they are betting will united a fractious country behind them.

I go back and forth thinking about this, and allowing Iran to go nuclear is a terrible scenario. The authors of the FP essay do a good job of laying out all the awful things that could result from Iran getting the bomb. But at the moment I think continued efforts at engagement, targeted sanctions, and assurances for our allies in the region (none more than Israel, who should receive an explicit guarantee of the US’s support in the form of being put formally under the US nuclear umbrella) should be the way to go. There is a feisty opposition movement in Iran that needs time to grow—Iranians, a huge portion of whom are young, are sick of the Mullahs and will hopefully in the near term change their own government.

Articles containment, iran, israel

George Friedman of STRATFOR is a prescient voice on global affairs, and as it happens he has just penned an article on Iran, which is timely for our upcoming discussion.

What is to become of the standoff between America and Iran? According to Friedman, sanctions cannot be effective against Iran, as the only meaningful one would be on gasoline (Iran imports 35% of its gasoline – I’d love to know why they need to do this when they have so much oil – can they not refine it?), and China and Russia will not play along with that particular sanction. Military strikes carry too much risk: they require good intelligence and massive bombardment with undoubtedly high casualties, with no guarantee that nuclear facilities will be destroyed. Plus, should such attacks occur, Iran is certain to launch counterattacks on Israel via Hezbollah, and on American forces in Iraq via its proxies there. Worst of all, Iran has the power to drive global oil prices through the roof by mining the Strait of Hormuz and launching missiles at any ships in that vital passage. For all of these reasons, STRATFOR does not find US or Israeli military strikes on Iran likely.

With diplomatic and military options ruled out, can America prevent Iran from developing nukes? Friedman argues that this is not as important as checking Iranian power in the region. We need Iran’s help, much as we needed the help of some other unsavory characters in the past:

Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous.

It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different.

Could the Roosevelt-Stalin and Nixon-Mao alliances provide a model for an Obama-Ahmadinejad/Khomeini Khamenei [oops, confused my mullahs there] rapprochement? Friedman’s whole article is worth a read.

Articles iran, iraq, israel, oil, usa, war

As we were planning our Iran session, Jeremy and I discussed whether we would be able to find someone with direct experience of Iran – well, that is, find someone and get them to accept our invitation – given the difficulties of traveling there. Today the LA Times published a piece about the costs and benefits of reporting on Iran from inside the country. Its title sums up the analysis: “Inside view is worth risk, reporters in Iran say“. [hat tip: Cyrus Farivar]

Despite the threat of arrest, despite the government shutting down newspapers and explicitly warning the media away from certain topics, the journalists quoted (mostly anonymously) all agreed that it was still better to be there on the ground than to cover Iran from afar. Which I suppose is rather unsurprising, since if they felt differently they obviously wouldn’t be there.

Journalists have to find a balance between doing their jobs – which requires that they independently investigate the government’s claims – and preserving the access they must have to do their jobs. Even in our own country, where no journalist would ever be imprisoned for a story, think of the run-up to the Iraq war. Government claims which were being easily debunked by independent journalists and bloggers were published uncritically and repeatedly by the Washington press corps.

Valid comparison? Discuss in the comments.

Articles iran, journalism, politics, usa, writing

Robert Baer, formerly a CIA operative, published a book in 2008 called The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, which I’m reading in preparation for our meeting next week. His theory is that Iran is rising and has imperial ambitions, that it has basically been at war with the United States for 30 years, and that the Iranians have already “half-won” the war. While America sees a country in the grips of Islamic fundamentalism, Baer says that underneath the religious veneer is nationalism and “a deep, abiding defiance of colonialism.” While we have been concerned with preventing Iran getting nuclear weapons, they have perfected the art of warfare by proxy, defeating Israel in Lebanon and hampering our own efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What it comes down to is this: Iran is the most powerful and stable country in the Middle East – a country the United States must either fight in a new thirty-year war or come to terms with.

I wouldn’t throw around the “superpower” label as easily as Baer, but he’s really using it as a rhetorical device. And he makes a key point early on (and I’m sure I’ll have more to say about this as I continue reading). The US has unwittingly aided Iran’s rise by smashing its chief rival: Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated Iraq. Baer believes that Iran has designs on Iraq’s oil, which if they came to pass, would see Iran producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. Not likely to happen soon – but remember that we will eventually have to withdraw our troops from Iraq, while Iran will remain right next door. The Saudis may be seeing the future that Baer envisions, because they’ve started making efforts at rekindling relations with Iran.

Baer talks about visiting the Nabatiyah martyr’s school in Lebanon, where the Iranian proxy Hezbollah trains children to become suicide bombers. He had come as a journalist (after retiring from the CIA) making a documentary, and listened to the teacher of a girls’ class explain why martyrdom is so important in Shia Islam. And yet when Baer asked the girls if they watched American TV, they all giggled and said they loved Oprah.

The sooner we understand how a girl from Nabatiyah’s martyrs’ school can watch Oprah, then strap on a suicide bomber’s vest and blow herself up in the middle of an Israeli patrol, the better prepared we’ll be to face what’s coming our way.

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The next Junta will take up the subject of Iran, and to focus the conversation, I’m asking the group to consider the possible scenarios five years from now. Things to consider:

• Will Iran have the bomb by then?
• Will the current ruling structures still be in power?
• What are the best/worst possible scenarios for US-Iran relations?
• What about China- or Russia-Iran relations?

We’ll talk about the effectiveness of sanctions and whether Obama might introduce new ones; compare the revolution of 1979 to the protests of 2009-10; and look for parallels in American and Iranian society. A number of us have strong views on the subject, and it should make for a lively debate.

Look for us to post details of the meeting soon – we’re thinking the second week of March. Meanwhile, I’ll expand on the above ideas in subsequent posts and provide some reading material. If you know people with particular interest or experience with Iran, please encourage them to join us.

UPDATE: The meeting will be held Tuesday, March 9, at 7:30pm. Location TBD.

UPDATE II: Location will be the Roebling Tea Room, 143 Roebling St, near the Bedford Ave stop on the L train, Brooklyn.

Meetings iran

China Economic Review highlights this WSJ story on American diplomatic efforts to get the Chinese to buy more oil from Saudi Arabia. The idea is that if China buys less oil from Iran, they will be more inclined to support the sanctions the Americans are proposing.

What about a converse situation? Instead of pressuring the Chinese to abandon their Iranian contracts, we could be lifting sanctions and doing more business with Iran. Didn’t someone once say that if goods don’t cross borders, armies will? We should be increasing ties to the Iranians – including business, academic and cultural connections – so as to decrease animosity.

Some will say that this would “reward” the Iranians for “bad behavior.” Nonsense. What have sanctions brought us, except more hostility? Even the Iranian protesters who were out on the streets demonstrating against Ahmedinejad do not favor sanctions against the regime they have far more reason to despise than we do.

If we really care about the brave Iranian souls who were out fighting for democracy this summer, we should reject sanctions and work toward the normalization of relations, which means doing business together.

In the News china, energy, iran, oil, saudi arabia

Just wanted to post something brief ahead of the next Junta. Like all of you I’m sure I’ve been following the events in Iran closely. I keep hearing the words Velvet Revolution thrown out in terms of the Iranian government’s fears that they will be pushed aside in a wave of liberal protests. But I wonder when a revolution loses its “velvet” character? Some might say that as long as it is a popular uprising and not an insurgent-led effort to topple a government, if the crowd has broadly humanist, universal values at the center of its demands than it can be called that. But does one death change that velvet tag? 10 deaths? 100? I had a hard time squaring the term Velvet Revolution with what was going in Iran after I saw the image of Neda dying on screen from a sniper bullet to the heart. The Czech’s revolution may have had a bit of violence in the early stages as protesters confronted security forces, but the state largerly crumbled as resolute protesters stood their ground. Not so in Iran which has showed a Chinese-like willingness to attack it’s own people. For those of you who haven’t seen the video, here it is:

http://www.inquisitr.com/26835/video-neda-iran-one-life-lost-for-a-greater-cause/

I hope Roger Cohen wins a Pulitzer for his reporting out of Tehran, which has been essential, here is a particularly good piece, which references the Velvet Revolution:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/opinion/16iht-edcohen.html?pagewanted=1&sq=velvet%20revolution&st=cse&scp=2

The next Junta will be timely with all this in mind. I keep thinking about how the Chinese are reacting to these events, apparently (no surprise) very cautiously, with chary coverage in the Chinese press. In recent years visiting places like Singapore versus the Philippines, watching elections in the Middle East that produce governments led by hateful Islamists, and generally feeling frustrated with the class of politicians (see Governor Sanford for the latest) that we have leading us, I have felt interested in societies like Singapore and China that function with general freedom but limited public space for political expression. I don’t want to live there, but am fascinated by their success and the bargains that are made between people and government (prosperity in exchange for giving up political participation). But the events in Iran remind us that these things can be overturned quickly and people do not want to be kept in a box. And if democracy has taken some lumps with the rise of China, the snail’s pace of reform in Europe, and the 2000 election in the US, we now have a president in the US that we can be proud of, one who got it totally right when he quoted Martin Luther King to describe how the unrest in Iran has an uncertain outcome but that ” the moral arch of the universe is long but it bends towards justice”.

In the News democracy, iran, protest

Date: Monday, July 6th
Time: 7-9pm
Place: Arrow Bar, 85 Avenue A, btw 5th/6th St.

The next Junta will be centered on the question of democracy in our time.

As democracy spreads through a society, power devolves from the elites and the middle class grows. Theoretically, this process should continue until the poor are also lifted up and empowered – but does it? Or does the middle class become accustomed to wealth and power, and protective of its position, to the detriment of “one man, one vote”?

Recent events in Thailand, Iran and the US have shown examples of democracy today.

• In Thailand, democracy has been hijacked by populism more educated urbanites who wouldn’t mind denying the vote to their country cousins and resulting in military coups and instability;
• In Iran, a religious superauthority has apparently rigged an election to prevent anyone challenging their hold on power – sparking an unrest they didn’t expect;
• And in the US, we have just elected the first minority president in our history only 8 years after a contest so closely divided it required a month of litigation and media scrutiny – and yet did not result in any mass uprising or social turmoil.

Is democracy “the worst form of government – except for all the others”, as Winston Churchill said? Or is “benign authoritarianism”–the Singaporean model–a better way than the chaos of democracy in nearby Philippines, or the flawed system of quasi-democracy and institutional patronage found in Malaysia?

We’re interested in seeing where these questions might lead, and to what other questions they might bring up.

Hope to see you all there-

Rindy and Jeremy

Meetings democracy, iran, politics, protest, thailand, usa