Iran Wrap
I started the discussion on Tuesday night with a sort of mini-argument: four points that I had arrived at over a couple of weeks reading on the subject of Iran, which I figured would get the ball rolling on the evening. Because of the sharp minds in attendance, it was all that was necessary to spark a great conversation. I said:
- Iran is the dominant power in the Middle East. This was a historical fact for a long time before Saddam Hussein’s Iraq became a check on Iran’s power—and now the US has removed that check. While Israel and Saudi Arabia are America’s allies in the region, Iran could take both of them, as it had indeed already defeated Israel in Lebanon. Even the US could not really take over Iran. We could bomb them into submission and take Tehran, but we would not be able to hold the country against the guerrilla threat they represent.
- Iran has the power to make the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan untenable, and indeed they have already done this to some degree. They have become experts at proxy warfare, and at this point they are able to determine the level of violence that US forces have to deal with in certain parts of both countries.
- All of this, it is important to note, does not require that Iran possess nuclear weapons. Indeed we (America) are quite powerless to stop them acquiring nukes if they are determined to have them. Sanctions won’t work; military attacks won’t work. Iran has the power to drive oil prices through the roof, by mining the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at tankers, which would make life in America very painful.
- Given all this, the best option is for America to reach some kind of settlement with Iran. This would involve giving Iran a formal role in maintaining the security of Iraq, which would likely end up partitioned. We would share responsibility for security of the Strait of Hormuz, because both countries have an interest in keeping the oil flowing. Trade and talk would increase as sanctions were lifted and diplomatic ties restored, and Iran would agree to stop arming Hezbollah and Hamas. America would stop talk of regime change and guarantee Iran’s security, in order to foster closer ties and stop the Iranians inching closer to Russia and China. In short, the US would balance its strategic alliances in the region.
There was some controversy in my words, because Jarrod came in right off the bat to challenge my first point, saying that Iran, in the wake of last year’s elections and subsequent protests, had never been weaker. And while it seems the mullahs aren’t going anywhere yet, I would concede that they might feel a bit restricted right now. Jarrod came back later in the evening, twice, on the point on nuclear weapons: the concern is not that Iran will use them, but that they will give them to others who will. “If a white light flashes over Israel, then that’s it, and Iran can say they had nothing to do with it.” Alex contended this forcefully, saying the uranium traces (or something) after an explosion would definitively prove where the bomb was made. So it seems Iran wouldn’t be able to get away with it, although that provides little comfort to Israel, since they are too small to absorb a nuclear explosion and still viably exist.
A lot was made of Ahmedinejad’s words towards Israel; although I argued that he didn’t have the final say in Iran, Noah said convincingly that he obviously spoke for the leadership. But Alex reminded us all that the fact is that there is no evidence Iran is pursuing nukes—citing the most recent intelligence reports. Noah claimed otherwise, mentioning the articles we have been seeing on our front pages for so long. But we also read a lot about Iraq’s weapons programs in the newspapers, I said, which turned out to be bluster.
We debated whether we could know the character of the Iranian people. Is there a “red/blue” divide, similar to America’s, with rural people more supportive of Ahmedinejad’s populism and jingoism, and urban “elites” more inclined towards cosmopolitanism and internationalism? Some argued in general support of this idea, although my conclusion was that we generally know very little of the Iranian people, despite the seeming ease of false labels.
The conversation broke into pieces several times during the evening, which was great. There were 10 people there, so it was inevitable that mini-convos would break out here and there. Of course I couldn’t follow everything that happened at once.
My most contentious point may have been the partitioning of Iraq. Some participants, Noah most vocally, said this would be crazy, that after spending so much blood and treasure we should “lose” Iraq. My point was that it was inevitable without American troops on the ground: should we stay forever? “Well, we’re still in Germany, we’re still in Korea,” Noah said. This is true of course, but it worries me. I don’t foresee a day when American soldiers are not being attacked in Iraq, or Afghanistan. I don’t think Korea and Germany are good models (in fact, I don’t think we should have troops in those countries, anyway). I argued that Iran already had some de facto control over southern Iraq, and that they would take it over when we left, anyway. But Noah seemed to think that we could leave a strong Iraqi government behind. This I doubt, and so it seemed we would not reach any agreement here.
Mark said something which put everything in perspective. Over the last 15-20 years (and I would argue, even longer), when the US has seen a geopolitical problem in the world, it has resolved to do something about it. We have gone into countries, or engaged with countries, in a way which we determined would solve the problem. We’ve taken decisive action. But most of the time, there have been unforeseen consequences that have either made the original problem worse, or created wholly new problems to deal with. Perhaps, in the future, we should endeavor to do less, to be more passive, and to let things play out before we act.
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What are your thoughts? If you were there, fill in my account with points I missed. If you weren’t, what would you have added?
Animal Welfare
I’m avid reader and admirer of Peter Singer, his columns with Project Syndicate (my ex-employer) are well worth reading. This month he used the recent tragic death of a trainer at Sea World by a killer whale to talk about the cruelty of animal parks and circuses. I find myself in total agreement; if I had kids I would not take them to the zoo or a circus for the exact reasons he lays out.
I had the good fortune spend a bit of time with Professor Singer when I was in Melbourne and starting to work on a story on animal welfare in China. I read his seminal book Animal Liberation at that time and, more recently, The Ethics of What We Eat, and his views have really influenced me. One thing I was struck by in the introduction to Animal Liberation was the fact that Professor Singer isn’t a particular animal lover per se—he just feels strongly that our views on animals are a form of speciesism that we need to rethink. His views made me question the way I eat, something that has been an ongoing process. Lately I’ve been reading reviews of Jonathan Safran Foer’s “Eating Animals” and I was struck by something I read by him in an essay on the Huffington Post. He talked about how eating ethically doesn’t have to be a zero sum game—you can strive to eat ethically without going vegan, or even fully vegetarian. He compares it to an environmentalist who accepts that he/she will sometimes drive in a car. That was really an epiphany for me. People sneer at the term, but I like the idea of the conscientious omnivore and that is what I strive for these days, trying to avoid eating meat that has been intensively raised.
I’d love to do a Junta on this issue. People so frequently just snicker or denigrate these ideas, but I think they are being defensive and there is a lot to explore philisophically about it and it has such a direct impact on our health and how we live.
The Effectiveness of Sanctions
WNYC carried a story this morning about American companies doing business in Iran. While technically it is illegal under American law for companies to deal with Iran, business successfully lobbied to be allowed to subvert the embargo by using their foreign subsidiaries. This is how, for example, Honeywell is able to sell Iran technology to refine oil into gasoline.
The SEC used to compile a list of companies that were evading sanctions in this manner. Lobbyists fought successfully to end that practice; however, the New York Times carried a story over the weekend listing 74 companies doing business with Iran despite US laws and national security strategies that aim to stifle such business. So who is really in charge? Uncle Sam or the oil and gas corporations? (For it is mainly energy companies on the list).
What’s more, the companies in violation (in spirit, if not in letter) are also recipients of major government contracts—totaling over $100 billion in the past decade. So not only do they flout the national policies of their government, but they aren’t even ostracized for doing so. Sounds like a compelling case for the pointlessness of sanctions.
“After Iran Gets the Bomb”
The lead essay in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs starts off with “The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to become the world’s tenth nuclear power”. It goes on from there to sketch out US options for containment, barely dwelling on the current arguments about whether sanctions will work, whether some military option should be used—it is a planning paper for a post-nuclear Iran. The authors take the view that Iran can be contained that if the US plays its cards right it doesn’t have to change the strategic equation in the middle east.
I don’t want to paraphrase all the author’s arguments, but a couple of points. Firstly, I find it a strange balancing act for the US to be sending senior foreign policy officials to the Gulf nations, who are also fearful of a nuclear Iran. On the one hand, we are trying to tell these “allies”, where we have military bases and from which we currently receive vital oil supplies, that we will protect them. Iran loves to incite these countries’ restive Shiite populations and Iran, similar to Japan before in the first part of the 20th century, sees itself as a liberator of Muslims in the region from western imperialism. But in the US there is a strong movement to move away from oil, to decouple ourselves from these regimes, so I would imagine leadership in those countries are complaining about mixed messages. I, for one, am tired of propping up these feckless Gulf states where the locals do no work and import south Asians to do everything while they live off their labor and oil while quietly financing terrorist activity.
It’s also hard to argue with Iran’s logic for acquiring nuclear arms. Surrounded on both sides by US forces (Iraq and Afghanistan) and mindful that non-nuclear Iraq was invaded and nuclear North Korea still hasn’t been, the Mullahs see the bomb as part of a guarantee of their continued rule. Their rhetoric and recent actions seem to almost invite a military strike against them, which they are betting will united a fractious country behind them.
I go back and forth thinking about this, and allowing Iran to go nuclear is a terrible scenario. The authors of the FP essay do a good job of laying out all the awful things that could result from Iran getting the bomb. But at the moment I think continued efforts at engagement, targeted sanctions, and assurances for our allies in the region (none more than Israel, who should receive an explicit guarantee of the US’s support in the form of being put formally under the US nuclear umbrella) should be the way to go. There is a feisty opposition movement in Iran that needs time to grow—Iranians, a huge portion of whom are young, are sick of the Mullahs and will hopefully in the near term change their own government.
A US-Iranian Deal
George Friedman of STRATFOR is a prescient voice on global affairs, and as it happens he has just penned an article on Iran, which is timely for our upcoming discussion.
What is to become of the standoff between America and Iran? According to Friedman, sanctions cannot be effective against Iran, as the only meaningful one would be on gasoline (Iran imports 35% of its gasoline – I’d love to know why they need to do this when they have so much oil – can they not refine it?), and China and Russia will not play along with that particular sanction. Military strikes carry too much risk: they require good intelligence and massive bombardment with undoubtedly high casualties, with no guarantee that nuclear facilities will be destroyed. Plus, should such attacks occur, Iran is certain to launch counterattacks on Israel via Hezbollah, and on American forces in Iraq via its proxies there. Worst of all, Iran has the power to drive global oil prices through the roof by mining the Strait of Hormuz and launching missiles at any ships in that vital passage. For all of these reasons, STRATFOR does not find US or Israeli military strikes on Iran likely.
With diplomatic and military options ruled out, can America prevent Iran from developing nukes? Friedman argues that this is not as important as checking Iranian power in the region. We need Iran’s help, much as we needed the help of some other unsavory characters in the past:
Roosevelt and Nixon both faced impossible strategic situations unless they were prepared to redefine the strategic equation dramatically and accept the need for alliance with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. American history is filled with opportunistic alliances designed to solve impossible strategic dilemmas. The Stalin and Mao cases represent stunning alliances with prior enemies designed to block a third power seen as more dangerous.
It is said that Ahmadinejad is crazy. It was also said that Mao and Stalin were crazy, in both cases with much justification. Ahmadinejad has said many strange things and issued numerous threats. But when Roosevelt ignored what Stalin said and Nixon ignored what Mao said, they each discovered that Stalin’s and Mao’s actions were far more rational and predictable than their rhetoric. Similarly, what the Iranians say and what they do are quite different.
Could the Roosevelt-Stalin and Nixon-Mao alliances provide a model for an Obama-Ahmadinejad/Khomeini Khamenei [oops, confused my mullahs there] rapprochement? Friedman’s whole article is worth a read.
The Price of the Inside View
As we were planning our Iran session, Jeremy and I discussed whether we would be able to find someone with direct experience of Iran – well, that is, find someone and get them to accept our invitation – given the difficulties of traveling there. Today the LA Times published a piece about the costs and benefits of reporting on Iran from inside the country. Its title sums up the analysis: “Inside view is worth risk, reporters in Iran say“. [hat tip: Cyrus Farivar]
Despite the threat of arrest, despite the government shutting down newspapers and explicitly warning the media away from certain topics, the journalists quoted (mostly anonymously) all agreed that it was still better to be there on the ground than to cover Iran from afar. Which I suppose is rather unsurprising, since if they felt differently they obviously wouldn’t be there.
Journalists have to find a balance between doing their jobs – which requires that they independently investigate the government’s claims – and preserving the access they must have to do their jobs. Even in our own country, where no journalist would ever be imprisoned for a story, think of the run-up to the Iraq war. Government claims which were being easily debunked by independent journalists and bloggers were published uncritically and repeatedly by the Washington press corps.
Valid comparison? Discuss in the comments.
Iran as “Superpower”
Robert Baer, formerly a CIA operative, published a book in 2008 called The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, which I’m reading in preparation for our meeting next week. His theory is that Iran is rising and has imperial ambitions, that it has basically been at war with the United States for 30 years, and that the Iranians have already “half-won” the war. While America sees a country in the grips of Islamic fundamentalism, Baer says that underneath the religious veneer is nationalism and “a deep, abiding defiance of colonialism.” While we have been concerned with preventing Iran getting nuclear weapons, they have perfected the art of warfare by proxy, defeating Israel in Lebanon and hampering our own efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What it comes down to is this: Iran is the most powerful and stable country in the Middle East – a country the United States must either fight in a new thirty-year war or come to terms with.
I wouldn’t throw around the “superpower” label as easily as Baer, but he’s really using it as a rhetorical device. And he makes a key point early on (and I’m sure I’ll have more to say about this as I continue reading). The US has unwittingly aided Iran’s rise by smashing its chief rival: Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated Iraq. Baer believes that Iran has designs on Iraq’s oil, which if they came to pass, would see Iran producing more oil than Saudi Arabia. Not likely to happen soon – but remember that we will eventually have to withdraw our troops from Iraq, while Iran will remain right next door. The Saudis may be seeing the future that Baer envisions, because they’ve started making efforts at rekindling relations with Iran.
Baer talks about visiting the Nabatiyah martyr’s school in Lebanon, where the Iranian proxy Hezbollah trains children to become suicide bombers. He had come as a journalist (after retiring from the CIA) making a documentary, and listened to the teacher of a girls’ class explain why martyrdom is so important in Shia Islam. And yet when Baer asked the girls if they watched American TV, they all giggled and said they loved Oprah.
The sooner we understand how a girl from Nabatiyah’s martyrs’ school can watch Oprah, then strap on a suicide bomber’s vest and blow herself up in the middle of an Israeli patrol, the better prepared we’ll be to face what’s coming our way.
Iran in 2015
The next Junta will take up the subject of Iran, and to focus the conversation, I’m asking the group to consider the possible scenarios five years from now. Things to consider:
- Will Iran have the bomb by then?
- Will the current ruling structures still be in power?
- What are the best/worst possible scenarios for US-Iran relations?
- What about China- or Russia-Iran relations?
We’ll talk about the effectiveness of sanctions and whether Obama might introduce new ones; compare the revolution of 1979 to the protests of 2009-10; and look for parallels in American and Iranian society. A number of us have strong views on the subject, and it should make for a lively debate.
Look for us to post details of the meeting soon – we’re thinking the second week of March. Meanwhile, I’ll expand on the above ideas in subsequent posts and provide some reading material. If you know people with particular interest or experience with Iran, please encourage them to join us.
UPDATE: The meeting will be held Tuesday, March 9, at 7:30pm. Location TBD.
UPDATE II: Location will be the Roebling Tea Room, 143 Roebling St, near the Bedford Ave stop on the L train, Brooklyn.
Africa: Human Rights
There’s been a flurry of awful stories out of Africa about attitudes towards homosexuality. Uganda has been considering an anti-gay bill that would in some cases impose the death penalty on homosexuals. In Kenya a gay wedding ceremony on the country’s more liberal coast-line almost resulted in a bloodbath with locals ready to burn the house down; the police intervened and shut the whole affair down. A similar case in Malawi resulted in the two men being arrested. Check out the story in Malawi if you want a more human face on any of these instances, really sad story, the attached pic says it all though, these two guys being mocked and physically threatened just because of who they are. In each of these cases, but in particular in Uganda, these countries have faced strong criticism from western countries, which provide a large amount of aid and hence have some leverage over these countries. Obama has denounced the Uganda bill, and Gordon Brown and other top leaders have called Uganda’s powerful president, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, to express concern. The result has been bewilderment and anger on the part of Africans, who see their anti-gay views as part of their culture and expressions of concern as meddling in their affairs. I hope western leaders continue to hold the line on this issue and use the leverage they have appropriately to effect change. This situation reminds me of the debate about women in Islamic countries, which was much talked about in the soul-searching following 9/11, but which has generally subsided of late. Just as it is clear that is wrong that women in Saudi Arabia are treated like second-class citizens, we should be careful to avoid moral relativism when dealing with Africa on homosexuality. Their views are backwards and wrong and need to change. Some values are universal and right and tolerance is one of them.
Top Taliban commander captured
Good news out of the Afpak region, the Taliban second in command, Mullah Baradar, was captured in Karachi. This is notable in itself, and comes as the US is leading an ambitious effort to capture the Taliban stronghold of Marja, but I was particularly happy to hear that the raid was a joint effort by Pakistan’s secret service, the ISI, and the CIA. The ISI has for a long time played both sides of the Taliban and the US for reasons clear in this article, and I think it’s critical to get the Pakistanis to abandon the Taliban as a client and work with the US to deny them sanctuary. That means attacking their strongholds in the tribal regions, which they’ve done in the last few months, and have the intelligence agencies work together to go after high-value targets. Hopefully this raid is just the first wave of this. What if the next few months Marja falls and the Afghans seem to actually hold the city themselves and set up a semi-decent government while a joint US/Pakistan raid captures or kills Mullah Omar (who is said to be in Karachi)? That kind of thing could be a game-changer and would be some well-deserved good news for the Obama foreign policy team, which I think is actually doing a good job.